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Abstract: As the number of companies fall into financial distress increasing, while corporate 
governance is name to be one of the factors, more studies has focused on their relationship.  Among 
the corporate governance mechanism being studied frequently is board of directors’ characteristics 
including board size, proportion of independent directors and potential duality.  Those are the 
variables being examined in this paper.  Based on the previous literature, however, there is no 
conclusive argument can be made on whether all these three variables are positively or negatively 
related to financial distress.  The inconclusive argument could due to the type of data being 
employed, for example between financial and non-financial data. 
 
 





Financial distress is an important issue 
that is often discussed in the field of 
corporate finance. This is because a company 
categorized as financially distressed often 
will have difficulty to meet its financial 
obligations when they fall due. This difficulty 
in turn can cause the collapse of the 
company.  It is extremely worrying as the 
number of companies fall under financially 
distressed category is increasing.  Many 
factors have been associated with the 
likelihood of a company to fall into financial 
distress, and corporate governance is one of 
them (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Zare, 
Kavianifard, Sadeghi, & Rasouli, 2013; 
Adams, 2012) 
Various stakeholder including 
researchers, regulators, investors and 
lenders have increased their focus on 
corporate governance throughout financial 
markets worldwide.  This increased 
attention has been further motivated after a 
series of remarkable corporate and 
accounting scandals like Enron, Tyco, and 
Worldcom in the United States. Board of 
directors was named to be responsible for 
these scandals.  For example, in the case of 
Enron’s failure, the US Senate debated that 
the board had been unsuccessful in its 
fiduciary duties to shareholders by not 
inquiring management about the 
complicated financial transactions Enron 
was engaging in (US House 2002).  
In Malaysia, corporate governance started 
being promoted after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, in which a loss in investor as 
well as a lack of effective corporate 
governance distinguished to contribute to 
the crisis (Ho & Wong, 2001).  In other 
words, corporate governance was one of the 
direct reasons of the crisis which caused the 
collapse of some companies and stock 
markets.  Accordingly, the first issue of 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) was released in March 2000.  One of 
the four principles developed in the the 
report is board of directors’ duties and 
responsibilities.  The board of directors is 
responsible to shape the company 
performance by revising and implementing a 
strategic plan, and monitoring the sufficiency 
and the integrity of the company’s 
management among others.  MCCG was 
further revised in the year 2007 and quite 
recently in 2012.  Among the focuses of both 
revision is to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities, and the structure of the 
board of directors in Malaysian public listed 
companies (MCCG, 2007 & 2012). This 
indicates that board of directors is a critical 
Proceeding of The International Conference on Government & Public Affairs 2016 (ICOGPA2016) 
ISBN 97898344661-7-6  
© 2016 ICOGPA2016 
 
mechanism in corporate governance because 
their presence can influence company 
decisions and their action and inaction can 
have substantial effect on the financial 
wellbeing of the company.   
The purpose of appointing board of 
directors are hiring or firing of executives, 
establishing strategic policies such as 
dividend policies, options policies, and 
executive compensation (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Besides those responsibilities, 
member of the board is accountable to give 
assistance in setting up company’s mission, 
supporting the executive in carrying their 
duties, while also guaranteeing the company 
has sufficient resources at their disposal and 
those resources are well-managed 
(Marciukaiyte, Szewczyk & Varma, 2009). 
These dutiful responsibilities thus have 
motivated this study for focusing on the 
board of directors’ characteristics 
contribution to the likelihood of financial 
distress.  This study will focus on three 
board of directors’ characteristics: board 
size, proportion of independent directors 
and potential duality of the chief executive 
officer (CEO) as chairman. 
Many researchers have investigated the 
relationship between the size of the board, 
independent proportion, potential duality 
and financial distress however, whether the 
three board characteristics can contribute to 
financial distress is still questionable.  
Debates on the impact of boards of directors’ 
characteristics on financial distress still 
continue because the findings on some 
studies are inconsistent.  
This study may contribute to the 
academic insight into the roles of corporate 
governance variables in predicting financial 
distress and be of interest to managers and 
shareholders. The paper proceeds as follows. 
This introduction is followed by some of the 
relevant theoretical and empirical studies 
and discussion as well as conclusion of the 
study will be presented in final section. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
A considerable amount of literature has 
been published on the impact of corporate 
governance on financial distress since the 
late 1980s (for example, Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1988; Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Simpson & Gleason, 1999; Brédart, 2014).  
The results from their investigation suggest 
that corporate governance can significantly 
enhance the detection mechanism for 
predicting financial distress. 
Before examining the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial 
distress, however, it is important to 
comprehend the definition of corporate 
governance. According to the Finance 
Committee on MCCG report (2012): 
“Corporate governance is the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and 
corporate accountability with the ultimate 
objective of realizing long term shareholder 
value, whilst taking account the interests of 
other stakeholders”. The focus of corporate 
governance is to ensure that company’s 
activities are properly managed in order to 
protect the interests of the investors.  The 
job of monitoring is left to the effective 
board of directors.   
An effective board of directors should 
monitor and make sure that the company is 
properly managed. The board must also 
draw up risk management mechanism to 
ensure that companies are protected from 
excessive financial risks that could lead to 
financial distress. Three board 
characteristics, as argued by Abdullah 
(2006), influencing the quality of a board: 
board size, board composition and board 
leadership structure (duality). 
 
2.1 Board size 
 
Theoretically, companies with larger size 
of the board of directors are less likely to 
face financial distress. According to agency 
theory, large board of directors is important 
simply because there will be more members 
to tighten the disciplinary control over the 
management team and CEO.  In other words, 
there will be more people will be reviewing 
management actions, thus, lead to lower 
probability of a company to become 
financially distressed (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003; Brédart, 2014).   
The resource dependency theory is also 
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parallel with agency theory.  Based on 
Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994) 
argument, larger size can provide more 
external links, thus giving the company 
better connection to outside resources 
(Gales & Kesner, 1994).  Shukeri, Shin, and 
Shaari (2012) also stated that large boards 
possessed knowledge diversification that 
may enhance company performance. In the 
context of financial distress, both the 
connections and diversification of expert is 
useful as a safeguard to protect the company 
from hardship.  
A number of studies (including Chaganti, 
Mahajan & Sharma, 1985; Daily & Dalton, 
1994; Darrat, Gray & Wu, 2010; Al-Tamimi, 
2012) had empirically tested the 
relationship between directors’s size and 
the likelihood of financial distress.  These 
studies, which carried out paired sample 
design, report that companies that are 
categorized as financially distressed have 
small size of board of directors.  This means 
that by having large board size, proper 
management and supervision will be 
emphasized, thus help avoiding company 
from facing financial problem. 
In contrast, some scholars argue that 
smaller board of directors is more effective 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Fich & 
Slezak, 2008). Interpersonal communication 
can become less effective, and there will be 
tendency that a few members are being 
dominant thus, prohibit resourceful input of 
the board, as the group size increases.  The 
argument in favor of smaller boards further 
noted that smaller groups are more 
manageable and less likely to split into 
fractions that can create group conflict 
(O’Reily, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989).   
According to Muth and Donaldson 
(1998), smaller board size encourages 
participation and social cohesion. Thus they 
will be able to make decision faster by 
cutting lengthy debate and move on more 
quickly. Shukeri et al. (2012) in their review 
summarize that as the number of board 
members increase, conflict of interest as 
well as communication obstacles will also 
arise, which ultimately deteriorate company 
performance. This group of scholars then 
suggested that board size is positively 
related to the likelihood of financial distress, 
that is a larger board size is more likely to 
fall into financial distress category.  There 
can be a number of reasons for having such 
an opposite finding, among which when the 
studies are using different sectors of 
companies as their data, for example 
financial and non-financial sectors.   
The studies presented thus far provide 
evidence that board size is an important 
factor in predicting the financial health of a 
company.  However, there is still a room for 
discussion in finding the ideal number 
directors sitting in board in order to be 
categorized as small or large.  Corporate 
board size can be as small as 2 to very large 
of around 30 over members (Chaganti et. 
all., 1985). A number of studies (for 
example, Jensen, 1993; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003) suggests the ideal figure for board 
size is around eight.  Any number greater 
beyond the optimum figure may result the 
board becoming inefficient (Abdullah, 
2006). The average number of directors 
sitting in the Australian companies’ board is 
6.6 (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003),  while in 
Malaysian, the figure is eight (Abdullah, 
2004). The evidence presented in this 
section suggests that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and the 
distressed status. 
 
2.2 Independent Directors 
 
The role of independent (or outside) 
directors in the board is believed to 
reinforce the monitoring of company 
performance and supportively intensify 
diversity.  For that reason, it has received 
substantial consideration over many years.  
Theoretically, findings related to the 
contribution of independent directors to the 
likelihood of financial distress have yielded 
equivocal empirical support. Agency theory 
suggests that companies having 
independent directors as the majority of 
their board members will be less likely to 
face financial distress. The proportions of 
the independent directors is measured in 
terms of the ratio of outside directors to 
board size (Zulkafli, Abdul Samad & Ismail, 
1999). Ideally, as outsiders, these 
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independent board members will be able to 
monitor any self-interested actions by 
managers and thus minimize the agency 
costs (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003).  On the other 
hand, stewardship theory contends the 
opposite.  It is not the work of independent 
directors that will reduce the likelihood of 
financial distress, but rather the job or non-
independent (inside) director, as they 
devote their effort to maximize the 
shareholders’s profit (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). 
Empirical investigations also reveal 
inconclusive conclusion.   Some studies 
found a negative relationship between 
proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Fich 
& Slezak, 2008; Darrat, et al., 2010; Lajili & 
Zéghal, 2010). In fact this proportion is 
relatively different in financially distressed 
companies compared to that healthy 
companies (Gales and Kesner, 1994).  
Financially distressed companies have 
relatively few independent directors.  These 
independent directors are important as they 
can give additional inputs and perspectives 
to the team's knowledge base (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978). They can act as supplements 
as well as linkages to external parties that 
control the company’s access to resources 
(Goodstein & Boeker 1991).  In other words, 
independent directors act like a strategic 
resource (Mace, 1986) since they can 
expand the company’s organizational 
knowledge (Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian., 
2008).   An independent outside director can 
also be helpful in the negotiation process as 
they may assist in “convincing creditor 
groups to agree to a proposed 
reorganisation plan prior to the formal 
bankruptcy filing” (Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996) (p.372).  Other related 
studies (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Kang, Lee & 
Yeh, 2004; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007)  
reported that those companies which have a 
higher percentage of independent directors 
experience lower likelihood of facing 
financial distress.   
However, the role of independent 
directors was suggested to be insignificant 
in determining financial distress status 
when Chaganti et al. (1985) examine this 
relationship using a retail example. A 
number of literature even found that 
independent directors are unfavorable to 
company survival and increase the 
likelihood of company failure.  Some argued 
that having too many independent directors 
in the board may devastate company value 
(Angrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Independent 
directors with deviating perceptions may 
politicize the governance process (Mace 
1971), thus, may weaken the effective 
leadership of the company (Barnard 1938).  
Other studies (Mace 1971; Whisler 1984) 
argued that perhaps the outside directors 
are just ritualistic rubberstamps, which 
means they have no influence over the 
company’s condition. Santen and Soppe 
(2009) in their Netherlands case study 
reported that, in general, financially 
distressed companies have a higher 
percentage of independent directors. Thus, 
whether independent directors have a 
positive or negative effect on financial 
distress remains an open question.  
 
2.3 Board leadership structure (duality). 
 
In some companies the position of CEO 
and the Chair of the Board is held by the 
same person (regarded as duality), although 
their roles are very dissimilar. Some studies 
find that the combination of the CEO and the 
board chairmanship has an important role in 
determining financial distress status. 
Several studies (for example Daily & Dalton, 
1994; Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001; Darrat, et 
al., 2010; Adams et al., 2011),  reported that 
companies with CEO acting as the board 
chairman are more likely to face financial 
distressed compared to those companies 
having different persons sitting as CEO and 
board chairman.  CEO duality can give 
difficult situation in making his evaluation, 
increases entrenchment risks and agency 
costs (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) 
and may possibly effect board decision 
making (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2002). The 
difficult situation may happen because the 
board, which is supposed to control the 
action of the managers, is led by the very 
person of monitoring.  
Another related study, Westphal and 
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Zajac (1995) recommend that in the CEO 
duality position, he or she may become 
more selective in electing board members 
by choosing those who will support 
him/her.  This argument can be supported 
by some empirical studies that recommend 
the separation of these two roles (for 
example Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Balsam & 
Upadhyay, 2009) can result in better 
company performance. 
However, there are others who do not 
find this relationship to be predictive.  
According to Chaganti et al.’s (1985); 
Abdullah (2006) and Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010) who hypothesized that duality is 
negatively related to financial distress found 
evidence of the roles of CEO duality in 
determining the company’s financial 
distress is mixed. CEO duality was found to 
be insignificant factor perhaps due to the 
lack of consensus on the recommendation 
for the separation (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001).   
Furthermore, in some corporate governance 
codes, such as the Cadbury Code, 1992 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992); the Hampel 
Report (1998); the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2000), appointing 
the same person as CEO and the board 
chairman are acceptable, as long as that 
companies disclosed in the annual reports 
the reason for the combination. In addition, 
existing literature is questioning on the 
benefits from the separation (Goodwin & 
Seow, 2000), and suggested that duality 
enable urgent strategic decisions and 
increased flexibility especially during 
declining performance (Depret et al., 2005). 
By combining the role of CEO and chairman 
to be held by one person will decrease 
agency problem because the agent’s act will 
as the agent will perform in his best interest 
while enhancing strategic vision and 
leadership to achieve companies’ objectives 
in contrast to an independent chairman. The 
literature findings suggest that CEO duality 
implies that leadership structure has an 
impact on the performance of the company.  
However they cannot agree on a single stand 
whether it will be positive or negative 
impact, thus leaving an open question to be 
explored. 
 
3. Proposed Framework  
 
The study selects a quantitative research 
design to examine the contributing effect of 
corporate governance factors on predicting 
financial distress among public listed 
companies in Malaysia.  In particular, the 
study employs logistic regression to figure 
out the relationship.  The dependent 
variable for the study is either healthy (0) 
or distress (1).  The independent variables 
are size of the board, the proportion of 
independent directors to total board 
members and duality which represent the 
board composition.  In addition to corporate 
governance factor, three (financial) control 
variables are included to assess the relative 
impact the independent variables.  Those 
three variables are profitability, leverage 















The study sample includes all non-
financial companies listed in the Bursa 
Malaysia for the period of 2000 to 2015.  
Financial companies are dropped from the 
sample due to the differences in the 
accounting procedure and treatment. The 
data is extracted from Thomson Eikon. 
 
4.  Hypothesis Testing  
 
This section describes how the 
relationship between the independent 
vatiables and the dependent variable will be 
managed and how the hypotheses of the 
study will be constructed and tested.  In 
order to test the significance of each 
variable’s impact on predicting financial 
distress, null and alternative hypothesis will 
be introduced to each of the variables.  Next, 
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data distribution, critical value, confidence 
level, t-test should be considered to validate 
the findings.  As a belief expressed, the null 
hypothesis is usually a statement of claim 
and statistic is held to be the norm.  Based 
on the literature review in the previous 
section, the hypotheses for the study is 
constructed as follows: 
 
H1a: There is a negative relationship 
between board size and the distressed 
status. 
H1b: There is a positive relationship 
between board size and the distressed 
status. 
H2a: Independent directors have a negative 
effect on financial distress. 
H2b: Independent directors have a positive 
effect on financial distress. 
H3a: CEO duality has a significant effect on 
financial distress. 
H3b: CEO duality has no significant effect on 
financial distress. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This conceptual paper provides a review 
on the relationship between board of 
directors’ characteristics and financial 
distress. The discussion focus on three 
board characteristics: board size, 
independent directors and duality. By 
reviewing previous literature in these three 
board characteristics, it is show that the 
impact of each characteristic on the 
likelihood of being financially distressed is 
inconclusive.  In other words, the effect that 
the effect can be positive or negative as 
each characteristic has its strength and 
weakness.  
Some studies proved large board size is 
negatively associated with financial distress 
status but some reported otherwise.  In 
terms of the proportion of independent 
directors, the more outsider were involve in 
the board the better linkage to external 
parties, thus may provide greater assistance 
in achieving company’s goal.  However, 
there might be free rider sitting on the 
board when the number is increasing.  
Similarly to the potential duality of CEO as 
the chairman of the board, theoretical view 
point agree that duality will be able to 
refrain the company from financial distress 
status, but empirically, some concluded that 
duality is not significant in predicting 
financial distress.  Thus, there is still room 
for further discussion on the contribution of 
board size, proportion of independent 
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